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(57) ABSTRACT 
Disclosed are embodiments of a security system for reducing 
data leaks by checking information flows between resources 
of a network. When an information flow is attempted between 
a sending resource, which can be anywhere in the network, 
and a receiving resource residing at a specific host within the 
network, a host labeler can determine whether information is 
allowed to flow from the sending resource to the receiving 
resource. The sending resource and the receiving resource 
can each have an applicable label, and each label can com-
prise zero, one, or more taints. For each taint having an active 
secrecy characteristic in a label of the sending resource, the 
host labeler can require that there be a matching taint with 
active secrecy characteristic in the receiving resource. If this 
condition is not met, the security system can block the infor-
mation flow between the sending and receiving resources. 
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SECURITY SYSTEMS AND METHODS TO 
REDUCE DATA LEAKS IN ENTERPRISE 
NETWORKS 
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATIONS 
This application claims priority to and the benefit under 35 
U.S.C. § 119( e) of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 
61/384,475, filed 20 Sep. 2010, which is incorporated herein 
by reference in its entirety as if fully set forth below. 
GOVERNMENT LICENSE RIGHTS 
This invention was made with Govermnent support under 
Agreement No. CNS-0916732, awarded by the National Sci-
ence Foundation. The Govermnent has certain rights in this 
invention. 
TECHNICAL FIELD 
Various embodiments of the present invention relate to 
network security and, particularly, to security systems and 
methods that reduce or prevent data leaks in enterprise net-
works. 
BACKGROUND 
Organizations must control where private information 
spreads and to whom it is accessible; this problem is referred 
to in the security industry as data loss/leak prevention (DLP). 
Commercial solutions for DLP are based on scanning con-
tent, where the content of traffic flowing outside an organiza-
tion is compared with patterns of sensitive data (e.g., nine-
digit social security numbers) to identify potentially private 
information. These solutions impose high overhead and are 
easily evaded, such as by simply encrypting data so that 
private information is unrecognizable. 
Research solutions to the DLP problem require rewriting 
applications or running custom operating systems, which 
cause difficulties in deployment for most enterprise environ-
ments. These solutions also typically attempt to prevent data 
loss from a single host, and not across a network, making it 
challenging to implement a data loss prevention policy for a 
network of devices. 
SUMMARY 
There is a pressing need for security systems and methods 
to reduce or comprehensively prevent the loss of sensitive or 
confidential data and assets from organizations, even in the 
face of determined and well-equipped adversaries. Prefer-
ably, such security systems and methods must not be easily 
evaded, for example, by transforming or encrypting sensitive 
data prior to an attempted leak event. Existing data loss/leak 
prevention (DLP) systems are overwhelmingly content-
based, implying that they can be easily defeated or circum-
vented through relatively simple and accessible tools. Con-
sequently, various embodiments of this invention are directed 
towards content-agnostic data loss prevention systems and 
methods, which are significantly harder to evade, and in addi-
tion impose far less overhead than content-based systems. 
An exemplary embodiment of such a content-agnostic 
security system can comprise a labeling system and an 
enforcement system. Generally, the labeling system can man-
age security labels forthe various sensitive resources or assets 
within an organization, such as files, processes, memory 
2 
pages, or database records. Labels have policies (known as 
capabilities) associated with them that restrict the flow of 
information from labeled resources. The enforcement system 
can then control information flows between resources based 
on the labels and their associated policies. 
An exemplary label can comprise a set of taints, where each 
taint can comprise an identification number, a secrecy bit, and 
an integrity bit. Each taints can have a capability associated 
with it that specifies the subset of enterprise users who have 
10 permissions to interact with a resource that carries the taint in 
its label. When the secrecy bit of a taint is set, the associated 
resource can be deemed secret with respect to that taint, and 
the security system can control flows of information from the 
resource to maintain the secrecy of the associated resource 
15 conformant to the taint's policy. Similarly, when the integrity 
bit of a taint is set, the security system can maintain the 
integrity of the associated resource by limiting information 
flows into that resource. Each resource can possess one or 
more of taints in its label, allowing for sophisticated policies 
20 to protect sensitive information from leakage as well as tam-
pering. 
The enforcement system can require that, for an informa-
tion flow to occur from a sending resource to a receiving 
resource, the enterprise user that owns the receiving resource 
25 must possess the capability to set the secrecy bit for every 
taint for which the sending resource has a set secrecy bit. 
Accordingly, secret data is not shared with a resource for 
which the owner does not have the capability to read secret 
data. Additionally, the creator of a secret resource can design 
30 a policy that allows a user Uthe capability to set the secrecy 
bit for a certain taint while denying the user the ability to unset 
the bit. This ensures that once U's receiving resource reads a 
secret resource, it may not be allowed to leak this sensitive 
information by writing to an external output device (e.g., a 
35 USB drive) that has all secrecy bits unset. Similarly, to pre-
serve integrity, the enforcement system can require that the 
owner of a resource sending data must have the capability to 
set the integrity bit for every taint in the sending resource for 
which the receiving resource has a set integrity bit. If these 
40 conditions are not met for an attempted information flow, the 
security system can block the information flow. 
This method of preventing data leaks by strictly controlling 
where sensitive information can flow using resource labels is 
referred to in prior art as information flow control. Embodi-
45 ments of the present invention have improvements and ben-
efits over prior art in this area, some of which are as follows: 
First, the security system can associate capabilities not with 
resources themselves, but instead with the users who own the 
resources. This feature allows for unmodified legacy applica-
50 tions to be secured using labels, by making the users that run 
these applications responsible for policy and capability man-
agement. Second, unlike prior information flow control sys-
tems, this security system can propagate taints between 
resources not just on a single computer, but between 
55 resources on a network of computers. Third, labels can be 
applied not just to processes and files, but also to other 
resources such as database records, memory pages, network 
sockets, peripheral devices, or the like, allowing arbitrarily 
fine granularity in controlling the flow of sensitive informa-
60 tion. Fourth, the security system can integrate tightly with an 
enterprise's existing user directories (e.g., Microsoft Active 
Directory), allowing enterprise users to easily set and change 
policies on the resources that they own. Fourth, to ensure that 
a sensitive resource can be taken out of the enterprise only by 
65 an authorized user, the security system can require that the 
user first unset the secrecy bits from all taints in the resource 
and, in some embodiments, additionally complete a "proof-
US 8,893,300 B2 
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of-human" challenge, such as a CAPTCHA (Completely 
Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans 
Apart), thereby preventing malicious programs masquerad-
ing as an authorized user from leaking sensitive information. 
These and other objects, features, and advantages of the 
security system will become more apparent upon reading the 
following specification in conjunction with the accompany-
ing drawing figures. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES 
FIG. 1 illustrates a security system operating within an 
enterprise network, according to an exemplary embodiment 
of the present invention. 
4 
particular label. A labeler module on each host within the 
network can use the label to determine what communication 
can take place between labeled resources on the host. When a 
first resource (e.g., a process) attempts to communicate across 
the network with a second resource on a different host, the 
security system can track the flow of information over the 
network using labels associated with network traffic. The 
labels can be used to enforce information flow policies, such 
as on an intermediate network device (e.g., a network 
10 
enforcer) or on the host that is the intended recipient of the 
traffic. By enabling information flow control between net-
worked hosts, the security system can also operate in net-
works with heterogeneous devices and operating systems. 
FIG. 2 illustrates a diagram of a typical label of the security 15 
system, according to an exemplary embodiment of the 
present invention. 
An exemplary embodiment of the security system sepa-
rates control operations (e.g., determining whether data may 
be forwarded) from data operations (e.g., forwarding data and 
associated labels). As a result, embodiments of the present 
invention provide various benefits over other information 
FIG. 3 illustrates a typical capability setting for an exem-
plary taint, according to an exemplary embodiment of the 
present invention. 
FIG. 4 illustrates a workflow involved in creating a new 
taint and securely applying the taint to a resource in the 
enterprise network, according to an exemplary embodiment 
of the present invention. 
FIG. 5 illustrates information flow between hosts, accord-
ing to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. 
FIG. 6 illustrates the security system being designed to 
protect a set of sensitive database records accessible through 
a web-based application, according to an exemplary embodi-
ment of the present invention. 
FIG. 7 illustrates an architecture of an exemplary host in 
the network to which the security system applies, according 
to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
To facilitate an understanding of the principles and features 
of the invention, various illustrative embodiments are 
explained below. In particular, the invention is described in 
the context of being a security system for reducing data leaks 
in an enterprise networks. Embodiments of the invention, 
however, need not be limited to protecting an organization 
against data leaks. Rather, various embodiments of the inven-
tion can be used to manage data permissions within an orga-
nizational network, to enable comprehensive tracking and 
auditing of sensitive data access and use, to protect sensitive 
data accessed from outside an enterprise network through a 
potentially untrusted web-based application, and can be used 
in networks other than enterprise networks. 
The components described hereinafter as making up vari-
ous elements of the invention are intended to be illustrative 
and not restrictive. Many suitable components that can per-
form the same or similar functions as components described 
herein are intended to be embraced within the scope of the 
invention. Such other components not described herein can 
include, but are not limited to, similar or analogous compo-
nents developed after development of the invention. 
Various embodiments of the present invention are security 
systems to reduce data leaks in enterprise networks. An exem-
plary embodiment of the security system can enforce infor-
mation flow control across a network for legacy applications. 
The security system can enable users, such as regular users or 
administrators of an enterprise, to associate labels with vari-
ous resources of an enterprise network. Such resources can 
comprise, for example, files, processes, or database records. 
Labels can be associated with policies, which can place 
restrictions on communication to or from resources with a 
20 flow control systems. For example, the security system can be 
uniquely able to perform information flow control for 
unmodified legacy applications in heterogeneous environ-
ments due to its novel capability system, which can allow 
enterprise users to control secrecy and integrity capabilities 
25 for their own data. The security system can perform informa-
tion flow control across a network of hosts running commod-
ity operating systems and unmodified applications, where 
prior research required all hosts to run a specialized operating 
system. The security system can also be simple and easily 
30 manageable, in that users can specify information flow poli-
cies for their own data, which policies can be centrally man-
aged. 
A particular exemplary embodiment of the security system 
operates in the context of web-based applications that are 
35 used to access sensitive database records by users external to 
the enterprise network. In this embodiment, when a user 
external to the enterprise network requests his or her sensitive 
database records, the security system can use information 
flow control to propagate the label on the user's database 
40 records across processing or transformation applied on the 
data by a potentially untrusted or vulnerable web application. 
The capability on the label can specify that the information 
flow outside the enterprise is permitted only to the user who 
owns the label, identified using his or her enterprise authen-
45 ti cation credentials. Thus, to retrieve this data from a location 
external to the enterprise network, the user merely authenti-
cates himself to the enterprise authentication service, which, 
in coordination with the network enforcer, can enforce infor-
mation flow between the web application and the public Inter-
50 net. This embodiment can prevents hacker or malicious web 
application components from reading a user's sensitive data 
and sending it out to an unauthorized Internet location. 
Referring now to the figures, in which like reference 
numerals represent like parts throughout the views, various 
55 embodiment of the security system will be described in detail. 
Overview of the Security System 
FIG. 1 illustrates the security system 100 operating within 
an enterprise network 10, according to an exemplary embodi-
ment of the present invention. As showninFIG.1, the security 
60 system can operate in an enterprise network comprising a 
plurality of hosts 50. An exemplary embodiment of the secu-
rity system 100 can comprise an enforcement system 110 and 
a labeling system 120. The labeling system 120 can manage 
labels of various resources of the hosts 50. A capability data-
65 base 430 (FIG. 4) can manage the capabilities of various 
enterprise users with respect to the labels on their resources. 
The enforcement system 110 can be in communication with 
US 8,893,300 B2 
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the hosts 50 and can control how data transactions are handled 
at each host 50 and between the hosts 50, so as to enforce the 
data labels. 
6 
P's host can automatically push P's label to the label reposi-
tory 128. Q's host 50 can automatically retrieve P's label from 
the label repository 128 and then perform any necessary 
information flow control checks. If the security system 100 
determines that the flow is impermissible, then the interac-
tions between the sending resource and the receiving resource 
can be blocked by the security system 100. 
The labeling system 120 can comprise a label repository 
128, one or more labelers 125, and one or more local label 
stores 123. The labeling system 120 can be distributed across 
the plurality of hosts, such that a labeler 125 of the labeling 
system 120 operates on each host 50, and a local label store 
123 resides on each host. Each labeler 125 can run indepen-
dently on its associated host 50 in communication with the 
local label store 123, and the labeler 125 can label data on that 
host in accordance with security policies and user instruc-
tions. In an exemplary embodiment, the local label store 123 
In some embodiments, P's host 50 can avoid pushing P's 
label to the label repository 128, and instead can directly 
10 attach the P's label to the network packets that are sent from 
P's host 50 to Q's host 50, usually as an optional field in the 
Internet Protocol "IP OPTIONS" header. 
is an in-memory structure that is buffered on disk and main-
tains the labels of some or all active and persistent resources 15 
on the host 50, such as running processes and files. The local 
label store 123 can exist to speed up label-related operations 
on hosts 50 by caching labels of active or persistent resources. 
The label repository 128 can be located at a central location 
and can be in communication with the various labelers 125. 20 
For example, the label repository 128 can be a computing 
device distinct from the various hosts 50. The labelers 125 can 
periodically, or on demand, push updated labels from the 
local label stores 123 to the label repository 128. As a result, 
the label repository 128 can maintain a list of labels for 25 
resources throughout the network 10. 
In addition to storing labels of resources on various hosts 
The enforcement system 110 can perform information flow 
checks. The enforcement system 110 can comprise a network 
enforcer 118 and, in some embodiments, a plurality of host 
enforcers 115. Each host enforcer 115 can reside on a host 50. 
In some embodiments, the host enforcer 115 can be integrated 
into an operating system, such as in the kernel, of the host 50 
on which it resides. The host enforcer 115 reduces informa-
tion leaks that may occur at the host 50. For example, and not 
limitation, the host enforcer 115 may block an attempt by a 
process to write the contents of a confidential file to a remov-
able drive. For each transaction within a single host where the 
labels of the sender resource P and the receiver resource Q 
differ, the labeler 125 of the host 50 can query the host 
enforcer 115 to decide whether an information flow is per-
mitted. 
The network enforcer 118 can control the propagation of 
information from inside the network 10 to outside the net-
50 in the enterprise network 10, the labeling system 120 can 
also be responsible for storing capabilities associated with 
labels through the capability database 430, including, but not 
limited to, the various types of permissions enterprise users 
may have with respect to the taints carried by each label. The 
capability database 430 of the labeling system 120 will be 
explained in more detail in a later section. 
30 work 10. In this case, the permissibility of information flow 
can be based on the sender's label and on network flow 
Through the labeling system 120, the security system 100 35 
can track and control the propagation oflabels. Users of the 
security system 100 can apply labels to one or a plurality of 
resources in the enterprise network 10. Each resource to 
which a label is applied can be, for example, a file or a process 
within the network 10. As the resources interact with each 40 
other within a single host 50, the labeler 125 on host 50 can 
directly mediate this interaction and enforce information flow 
checks using a host enforcer 115. If, however, resources on 
two networked hosts interact, the labeler 125 can use the help 
of the label repository 128 in order to transfer the label of the 45 
sending resource to the receiving resource, so as to enable 
enforcement to happen at a network location (e.g., at the 
switch) or at the receiving host enforcer 115. 
The flow of information generally occurs from a first 
resource to a second, receiving resource. "Information flow" 50 
refers to how data is transmitted from between resources. For 
example, when a process writes to a file, then data flows from 
the process to the file. However, when a process reads from a 
file, then data flows from the file to the process. One of skill in 
the art will recognize that data may be transmitted, and there- 55 
fore "flow," between resources in various manners, and that 
the above examples are provided for illustrative purposes 
only. 
In an exemplary embodiment of the security system 100, 
the host 50 of the receiving resource can initiate an informa- 60 
tion flow check to ensure that the flow of information is 
attributes. For example, the network enforcer 118 can prevent 
traffic flows that may contain secret information, as indicated 
the by the traffic's label, from reaching insecure networks 
(e.g., an open wireless network, or the outside Internet). 
Structure of Taints and Labels 
FIG. 2 illustrates a diagram of a typical label 200 of the 
security system 100, according to an exemplary embodiment 
of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 2, each label can 
comprise one or more taints 210, where each taint relates to a 
quality of a resource to which the associated label 200 is 
applied. 
In some exemplary embodiments, a taint 210 can be rep-
resented as an integer, such as a 64-bit integer. A taint can 
comprise an identification 250 and a value for each of one or 
more characteristics. Each characteristic can have at least two 
possible states, where one of such states is applicable at a 
given time. For example, and not limitation, a characteristic 
can be active or inactive, true or false, on or off, set or unset, 
or 1 or 0. Because a characteristic belongs to the taint 210 of 
which it is a part, it will be understood that references to a taint 
210 being in a particular state (e.g., "a secret taint," "an active 
taint") throughout this disclosure indicate that a characteristic 
of the taint 210 is in such particular state. 
The characteristics of a taint can include, for example, a 
secrecy characteristic 220 and an integrity characteristic 230. 
Each characteristic can be represented in the taint 210 by a 
Boolean variable, which can be set (i.e., set to "true") or not 
set (i.e., set to "false"), to indicate whether the characteristic 
applies to the associated taint 210. For example, and not 
limitation, a first bit of the taint 210 can represent a secrecy 
characteristic 220, a second bit can represent an integrity 
characteristic 230, and the remaining portion of the taint 210 
can be an identification 250 of the quality indicated by the 
permissible. For example, if information in a data transaction 
flows from a resource P to a resource Q on a single host 50 
(e.g., a process writes to a file), the labeler 125 on that host can 
retrieve the labels for both P and Q before initiating informa-
tion flow control checks. If P and Qare on different hosts in 
the network 10 (e.g., a process sends data to a remote server), 
65 taint 210. 
In some exemplary embodiments of the security system 
100, a particular taint 210 with no characteristics in the set 
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state serves no operational purpose within a label 200. In 
these exemplary embodiments, if such a taint 210 were 
removed from the label 200, the effect of the label 200 on its 
associated resource would be unchanged. Accordingly, 
throughout this disclosure, references to a label 200 having a 
particular taint 210 that is unset with respect to some charac-
teristic may include labels 200 lacking the particular taint 210 
in question. When a taint 210 is not present, such taint 210 can 
be deemed to be unset with respect to all characteristics. 
8 
320 that is used by lay enterprise users to denote taint iden-
tification 250, and a capability table 330 that denotes the 
capabilities of enterprise users with respect to the taint 210. 
The taint mnemonic 320 can be a string or phrase that is 
assigned to the taint 210 by the user that originally creates the 
taint, preferably chosen so that it is easy to memorize. For 
example, and not limitation, ifthe taint 210 is used to protect 
sensitive data pertaining to employee salary reports, the user 
that creates the taint can assign the taint nmemonic 320 as 
10 "Salary Reports." If a characteristic of a taint 210 is set, then the resource to 
which the label 200 applies can require an information flow 
check when communicating with other resources, so as to 
insure that the data of that resource is not shared with 
resources without adequate capabilities. Generally, in an 
exemplary embodiment, the security system 100 can prevent 
information flows from resource P to resource Q, if resource 
Pis labeled with a taint 210 having a set secrecy characteristic 
220, where resource Q does not have the same taint with a set 
secrecy characteristic 220. This protects any secret confiden-
tial data in resource P from being transferred into resource Q, 20 
when Q lacks the same secrecy status. The opposite can be 
true for the integrity characteristic 230. An information flow 
can be blocked when the sending resource lacks a set integrity 
characteristic 230 in a taint for which the receiving resource 
has a set integrity characteristic 230, thus protecting the integ- 25 
rity of the receiving resource. In some instances where the 
taint's capability permits, which will be explained in more 
detail below, the security system 100 can automatically raise 
the secrecy (i.e., by setting the secrecy characteristic for the 
applicable taint) or raise the integrity (i.e., by setting the 30 
integrity for the applicable taint 210) of the receiving 
resource, so as to enable the information flow to proceed. 
The capability table 330 can be a dynamic table that 
denotes the capability of each enterprise user in two cases: (1) 
when a resource owned by the user possesses the taint 210 in 
its own label and attempts to interact with other resources, or 
15 (2) when a resource owned by the user interacts with another 
resource that possesses the taint 210 in its label. The capabil-
ity table 330 can include, but is not limited to, a list of 
usemames 331 and their capabilities 332-337 with respect to 
the taint identification 210. 
For illustrative purposes, suppose SP denotes the set of 
taints in the label 200 of a resource P for which the secrecy 
characteristic 220 is set, and suppose IP denotes the set of 35 
taints of the same label 200 that have the integrity bit set. If 
any secrecy or integrity characteristic 220 or 230 of a label 
200 is set, the labeled resource can require an information 
flow check before each attempted communication with 
another resource is allowed. In some exemplary embodi- 40 
ments, the security system 100 can allow information to flow 
from P to Q only if: 
Sp_:=_ SQ (i.e., Sp is a subset of SQ); and 
IQ_:=_Ip (i.e., IQ is a subset oflp). 
The rule requiring that Sp be a subset of SQ is referred to 45 
herein as the secrecy rule. The rule requiring that IQ be a 
subset ofIP is referred to herein as the integrity rule. It will be 
understood that, although some exemplary embodiment of 
the security system 100 require these rules to be met to permit 
an information flow, other exemplary embodiments can 50 
enforce a different set of rules. 
Each user of the network can have, but is not limited to, 
zero, one, or more of various capabilities with respect to each 
taint 210. For each taint, available capabilities can include the 
following: 
1. Capability to set the secrecy characteristic (s+ 332); 
2. Capability to unset the secrecy characteristic (s- 333); 
3. Capability to set the integrity characteristic (i+ 334); 
4. Capability to unset the integrity characteristic (i- 335); 
5. Capability to add users who can make modifications to 
the taint capability 310 (o+ 336); and 
6. Capability to remove users who can make modifications 
to the taint capability 310 ( o- 337). 
The user who creates a particular taint 210 can automati-
cally have all six capabilities with respect to the taint 210. 
When a new user is added to those who can manage the taint 
210, the new user can automatically be granted a subset of the 
capabilities. For example, and not limitation, let enterprise 
user Alice be a user who creates a particular taint 210; con-
sequently, she can receive all capabilities 332-337 forthe taint 
210, denoted by check marks ( ./ ) in the capability table 330 
corresponding to Alice's row. Because Alice possesses the o+ 
capability, she may add a user, Bob, to the capability table, 
allowing him only the capability for s+ and i-, denying him 
s-, i+, o+, and o-, as denoted by cross marks (x) in the 
capability table 330 corresponding to Bob's row. 
In addition, the capability table 330 can also have a wild-
card user entry 340 that can be used to denote permissions 
toward users not explicitly named in the capability table 330. 
The wildcard capability setting can be used by the owner(s) of 
the taint 210 to automatically set permissions for other enter-
prise users. For example, Alice could set the s+ capability 
alone for the wildcard user to allow other enterprise users to 
access and read data from a resource that possesses the taint 
210, but deny these users from leaking any sensitive informa-
tion from the resource after they have read it. The utility of 
Taints, which can make up the labels, can be initially set up 
by users of the security system 100. Whether the security 
system 100 allows a user to create a new taint or modify an 
existing label 200 with a specific taint can depend on the 
assigned capabilities of the user with respect to the taint 210 
in question. 
55 various fields in the capability table 330 will become apparent 
in the following sections, which discuss host enforcers 115 
and network enforcer 118. 
Taint Capabilities 
FIG. 3 illustrates a typical capability setting 310 for an 
exemplary taint, according to an exemplary embodiment of 60 
the present invention. The taint capability 310 can be main-
tained for centrally by the capability database 430. The host 
enforcer 115 and network enforcer 118 can query the capa-
bility database 430 when they encounter an information flow 
between two resources where at least one resource's label 65 
possesses the taint 210 in question. The taint capability 310 
can comprise the taint identification 250, a taint nmemonic 
One of skill in the art will recognize that the representations 
of the capability table 330 is exemplary, and actual imple-
mentations may involve analogous or extended representa-
tions for storing capabilities of users with respect to taint 
identification 250. 
Creating and Applying Taints to Resources 
FIG. 4 illustrates a workflow involved in creating a new 
taint and securely applying the taint to a resource in the 
enterprise network, according to an exemplary embodiment 
of the present invention. An enterprise user 410 may use an 
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enterprise host 50 to create and apply a taint 210 to a file F 
435, in this workflow. The host 50 may run an operating 
system that can typically be partitioned into programs run-
ning in userspace 420 and kernel space 430. Within the con-
text of the security system 100, accesses to the file F 435 can 
be mediated by the labeler 125, in coordination with the host 
enforcer 123 and the capability database 430. 
In an exemplary embodiment of the security system 100, a 
user 410 does not have direct access to labels associated with 
the various resources of the host 50. To protect a file F 435, 10 
using the security system, the user 410 may be required to use 
a centralized authentication service and taint management 
console 445. Step 1 in protecting file F 435 can be to use a 
taint management application 425 running in userspace 420 
on host 50 to choose a file F 435 to which a taint 210 is to be 15 
created and applied. The taint management application 425 
can be various programs that can communicate with the 
authentication service and taint management console 445. 
For example, and not limitation, the user 410 can use a web 
browser for this purpose. Alternatively, the user 410 can use a 20 
desktop service to communicate with authentication service 
and taint management console 445, which can be invoked by 
accessing familiar permissions menus, e.g., by "right-click-
ing" a file and choosing "File Properties." 
10 
request can carry additional parameters that specify the type 
of modification requested, which may include changing the 
taint nmemonic 320, adding or removing users to the capa-
bility table 330, or changing specific capabilities for one or 
more users in the capability table 330. The TAINT_MAN-
AGE request can be used for additional commands pertaining 
to taints, including, but not limited to: 
1. Adding the taint to a resource's label: This type of 
request can add the requested taint to a specified 
resource's label, provided the user 410 has the required 
capabilities to perform this action. 
2. Adjusting capabilities of taints in a label: If the taint is 
already present to the specified resource's label, this 
type of request can set or unset the secrecy or integrity 
characteristic for that taint, provided the user 410 has the 
required capabilities as per the capability database 430. 
3. Removing a taint from a resource's label: This type of 
request can remove a taint 210 from a specified 
resource's label 200, which may imply adjusting capa-
bilities of the selected taint 210 by unsetting both the 
secrecy and integrity characteristics 220 and 230 from 
the taint 210 in the specified resource's label 200. 
In Step 3 of FIG. 4, the authentication service and taint 
management console 445 can verify that the specific request 
The taint management application 425 can communicate 
the user's taint management request on behalf of the user to 
the authentication service and taint management console 445, 
as illustrated in Step 2. The request can comprise, without 
limitation, the following information: (1) the credentials 
(e.g., a login username, password, and optionally a 
CAPTCHA test to distinguish automated requests); (2) the 
identification of the file F 435 or any other resource for which 
the user wishes to manage labels 200 or taints 210; (3) the 
type of request, which can be, but is not limited to, one of 
TAINT_CREATE, TAINT_MODIFY, or TAINT_MAN-
AGE. 
25 issued by the user 410 satisfies the capabilities assigned to the 
user 410. In Step 4, the capability database 430 can repackage 
the request and communicate with the labeler 125 on the host 
50 where the specified resource, file F 435, is located. In Step 
5, the labeler 125 on the host 50 can locate the resource, file F 
30 435, and perform the requested operation on the specified 
taint 210 on file F's label 200. Depending on the outcome of 
this action, the labeler 125 can inform the capability database 
430 and the authentication service and management console 
445 about the success status of the request. In Step 6, the 
35 authentication service and taint management console 445 can 
communicate the success or failure of the user's request back 
to the user through the taint management application 425. 
Enforcement of Labels with Information Flow Checks 
The authentication service and taint management console 
445 can be a centralized service that can be in communication 
with a plurality of hosts 50 in the enterprise, the capability 
database 430 (in order to create and manage capabilities on 40 
taints), and an enterprise-wide user directory service, for 
example, Microsoft Active Directory, OpenLDAP (Light-
weight Directory Access Protocol), or Network Information 
Services (NIS). The authentication service and taint manage-
ment console 445 can also provide a detailed visual display 45 
for each authenticated user 410 that allows him or her to view, 
create, manage, and modify one or more of the taints owned 
FIG. 5 illustrates an example of checking information flow 
within a single host 50, according to an exemplary embodi-
ment of the present invention. It will be understood that this 
example is provided for illustrative purposes only and does 
not restrict the scope of the invention. As shown in FIG. 4, file 
F and process Preside on the host 50. Process P attempts to 
read secret File F, which would result in a flow ofinformation 
from file F to process P. 
File Fis a secret file (i.e., is labeled with a taint having a set 
secrecy characteristic). When process P attempts to read F, the 
labeler 125 retrieves the labels for file F and process P from 
the local label store 123. The labeler 125 then queries the host 
enforcer 115 with the labels 200 of F and P to determine 
whether information from F to P is permissible. The host 
enforcer 115 retrieves the capabilities of the users that own F 
and P for all taints in the labels ofF and P from the capability 
by the user 410. After the authentication service and taint 
management console 445 authenticates the user 410, it can 
accept the remainder of the user's request, which may include 50 
an identifier to a resource in the enterprise and a request type. 
The identifier to the resource can include the host identifier 
where the resource is located, the access path forthe resource, 
and the type of resource (e.g., file, process, memory page, 
database record, etc.). For illustration, FIG. 4 illustrates an 
example in which the resource chosen by the user 410 is a 
regular file, F 435, located on the user's own host 50. 
The user 410 can issue various types of requests. The 
TAINT_CREATE request may be used by the user 410 to 
create a new taint 210 with default capabilities, which 
defaults can place the user 410 as owner of the newly created 
taint 210 with full capabilities, and no capabilities for other 
users. This request can carry additional parameters including, 
but not limited to, the taint nmemonic 320 and a capability 
table 330. The TAINT_MODIFY request can be used to 65 
modify the capabilities of an existing taint that has user 410 
listed as an owner (i.e., the o+ and o- capabilities). This 
55 database 430, and the hose enforcer 115 then determines 
whether the attempted information flow would cause a viola-
tion of the secrecy rule, the integrity rule, or another infor-
mation flow rule. 
FIG. 5 illustrates an example of checking information flow 
60 between two resources on different hosts 50 across the net-
work 10, according to an exemplary embodiment of the 
present invention. As shown in FIG. 5, suppose a malicious 
process Pon a first host 50 attempts to exploit a trusted server 
process Q on a second host 50. Because the attempted infor-
mation flow requires P's data to be transmitted over the net-
work 10, the labeler 125 on thefirsthost50 pushes P's current 
label 200 to the label repository 128, which can be at a 
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location accessible to the network enforcer 118 and the 
labeler 125 of the second host 50. The network enforcer 118 
can check whether the attributes of the information flow and 
12 
are used to access sensitive data stored in files or database 
records. Web-based applications may be used by enterprise 
users to access their sensitive data stored in internal enterprise 
servers from outside the enterprise. Unfortunately, web-
based applications today are a primary vector of data leaks 
from enterprises and are regularly exploited to leak sensitive 
database records from organizations. Embodiments of the 
security system 100 can defend against breaches that exploit 
web application vulnerabilities while permitting legitimate 
of P's label 200 permit the attempted information flow to 
occur. If the network enforcer 118 allows the information 
flow to reach the second host 50, the labeler 125 of the second 
host 50 can retrieve P's label 200 from the label repository 
128. From this point forward, the security system's opera-
tions can be the same or similar to those that would occur 
from an information flow attempt isolated to a single host 50. 
The second host's labeler 125 can invoke its host enforcer 115 
to perform the information flow check using the respective 
labels 200 of P and Q. The host enforce 115 can complete this 
check after retrieving the appropriate user capabilities from 
the capability database 430. 
10 enterprise users to seamlessly access their sensitive data from 
outside the enterprise. 
FIG. 6 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of the security 
system 100 designed to protect a set of sensitive database 
records accessible through a web-based application 620. It 
Preventing Data Leaks 
15 will be understood that various other implementations of the 
security system 100 may also be used to prevent data leaks 
through web applications 620, and the implementation pro-
vided in FIG. 6 is for illustrative purposes only. 
The security system can prevent data leaks using informa-
tion flow control. Sensitive data that is to be protected from 
leaks can be associated with a taint 210, T. The user that 
applies the taint T to the sensitive data may ensure that none 20 
but a trusted set of enterprise users are granted the s+ capa-
bility on the taint T. Thus, when an unauthorized user not in 
the set of trusted users attempt to access a file protected with 
taint T, the host enforcers 115 on the applicable hosts 50 can 
determine, using the capability database 430, that the infor- 25 
mation flow to the unauthorized user's program constitutes an 
unpermitted information flow, and can therefore prevent the 
operation from taking place. 
Now assume that one of the users in the trusted set of users 
who are granted the s+ capability on taint T is malicious and 
wishes to leak the sensitive information outside the enterprise 
network. Such cases would include, for example: (1) the user 
is benign but is accidentally running a malicious program 
which attempts to leak the data, or (2) the user is benign, but 
A sensitive database 610 on a host 50 can contain one or 
more records that are sensitive, with an enterprise user's 
sensitive data occupying one or more rows of the database 
610. For example, and not limitation, the database 610 can 
include three columns: a user name, a secret (e.g., an account 
balance), and a taint 210 that is attached to each sensitive 
record. The database 610 may be accessible to enterprise 
users from outside the enterprise network 10 through an 
untrusted web application 620. The web application may be 
susceptible to compromise by external hackers, or the web 
application 620 itself may be malicious and attempt to send 
30 data it reads from the database 610 to unauthorized destina-
tions outside the network 10. The database 610 and untrusted 
a service that runs under the user's capability is under the 35 
control of a hacker external to the enterprise. Because the user 
web application 620 can run on hosts 50 equipped with the 
labeler 125 and host enforcer 115, positioned within the 
enterprise network 10 behind the network enforcer 110 and an 
authentication service and taint management console 445. 
This exemplary embodiment of the security system 100 
can allow legitimate users to retrieve their secret database 
records while disallowing hackers, or a malicious web appli-
cation components, from leaking data. In Step 1, a legitimate 
user may connect to the web application's Uniform Resource 
Locator (URL) in order to access the user's secret data. Prior 
is granted s+, his programs are able to read the sensitive data, 
and even make copies, some of which may even be encrypted. 
However, the labeler 125 on the malicious user's host 50 can 
ensure that all copies of the sensitive data will continue to 40 
carry the taint T. 
to reaching the web application 620, the user can be redi-
rected to the authentication service and taint management 
console 445 in Step 2, where the user must authenticate 
himself by presenting his enterprise credentials. Once 
authenticated, the user can be redirected to the untrusted web 
application 620 in Step 3, where the user man request that the 
web application 620 retrieve his secret account balance from 
the database 610. In step 4, the web application 620 may issue 
Now suppose the malicious user attempts to copy an 
encrypted version of the sensitive data to a removable disk 
drive. The host enforcer 115 on host 50 cam always assign 
immutable empty labels 200, which carry no taints 210, to 45 
each output device that represents a potential data leak. Thus, 
the host enforcer 115 can understand that writes of sensitive-
labeled data to unauthorized output devices, including, for 
example, removable disk drives, printers, secondary network 
cards, Bluetooth, and infrared, constitute a violation of infor-
mation flow control rules, because the label 200 of the output 
device cannot carry a secret taint 210, even if the user pos-
sesses the s+ capability. Thus, the host enforcer 115 can detect 
50 a retrieve request on behalf of the user for the user's database 
entry. In Step 5, the requested database record may be 
released by the database 610 after applying an applicable taint 
210 to the data prior to release. This taint 210 can be com-
pared by the host enforcer 110, on either the database server a potential data leak and stop the requested transfer from 
taking place. The malicious user may also be unable to leak 
sensitive data over the network 10 (e.g., over an encrypted 
connection to a remote Internet server) because the network 
data that he sends out can be identified as carrying sensitive 
content by the network enforcer 118 using the label repository 
128, and can therefore be blocked from leaving the network 
10. Because the owner of the taint T only granted the mali-
cious user the s+ capability and not the s- capability, the user 
may be unable to remove the taint T from any of his files that 
contain sensitive content. 
Preventing Data Leaks in Web-Based Applications 
An exemplary embodiment of the security system 100 can 
be used to prevent data leaks in web-based applications that 
55 host 50 or the web application server host 50, to ensure that 
the requesting user has the requisite capability to view the 
record (e.g., the s+ capability). After receiving the database 
record, the web application 620 may forward a response to the 
user through the network enforcer 110. At this stage, in Step 
60 6, the network enforcer 118 can compare the taint 210 on the 
outgoing data flow with the list of users that are logged in, 
utilizing the authentication service and taint management 
console 445 as needed. This step may be crucial to decide 
whether the user who requested the data has the requisite 
65 capability to declassify the data such that it can be sent outside 
the enterprise network 10 (e.g., the s- capability). After the 
network enforcer 118 confirms that the tainted network flow 
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is destined to the web session ofan authenticated user with the 
appropriate capability with respect to the taint 210, the net-
work enforcer 118 can automatically declassify the taint 210 
to permit the data to leave the enterprise network 10. 
14 
Resultantly, the security system 100 can prevent data leaks 
even ifthe untrusted web application 620 is compromised in 
one of many potentially unknown ways. Even if an attacker 
has complete control over the web application 620 and can 
read any database record from the database 610 without hin-
drance, the attacker may be blocked from exporting sensitive 
data outside the network 10, because the authentication ser-
vice and taint management console 445 can find that the 
attacker is attempting to access sensitive information carrying 
a taint 210 on which the attacker does not have the s- capa-
bility. 
mation flow control used in prior art, and improvement that 
can result in minimal inconvenience for enterprise users when 
dealing with resources whose labels 200 have one or more 
taints 210 with the secrecy characteristic 220 set. Typically, in 
enterprise networks 10, sensitive information is broadly 
accessible to enterprise employees and users, and the key 
need for enterprises is not to prevent employees from viewing 
sensitive data but to prevent them from exfiltrating such data 
outside the enterprise network confines. In conventional 
10 information flow control policy schemes, if a resource P with 
no taints in its label attempts to read information from a 
resource Q with one secrecy taint 210, the resource P first has 
to apply the taint 210 to its own label 200 to raise its own 
Improvements Over Prior Art in Information Flow Control 
Some aspects of the present invention are related to prior 
art in information flow control. Specifically, in "A Decentral-
ized Model for Information Flow Control" published in the 
1997 Symposium on Operating Systems Principles by 
Andrew C. Myers and Barbara Liskov, the authors propose a 
programmatic model to restrict the flow of information 
between components of applications such that an untrusted 
application cannot leak it. In "Information Flow Control for 
Standard OS Abstractions" published in the 2007 Symposium 
on Operating Systems Principles, Maxwell Krohn et al. pro-
pose an information flow control scheme that works on com-
modity operating systems. 
15 secrecy level, provided the user that owns P possesses the s+ 
capability on the taint 210; only then can P attempt reading 
from the resource Q. If the present invention followed stan-
dard rules of information flow control, the user that owns P 
would have to manually apply the taint 210 to Peach time P 
20 accessed a sensitive resource, even if the user possessed the s+ 
capability on the taint 210. 
To reduce user intervention and to allow newly created 
processes to read secret files without alerts and warning mes-
sages, the security system 100 can modify the conventional 
25 rules for information flow control. Specifically, in some 
embodiments of the security system 100, the labeler 125 can 
automatically allow information flows that only raise a 
resource's secrecy (or integrity), provided that the user own-
ing the resource has the s+ capability to the raise the resourc-Various embodiments of the present invention include 
improvements over prior art that can make the present secu-
rity system 100 more effective, convenient, functional, prac-
tical, or cost-effective than the prior art. First, the present 
invention can perform information flow control for unmodi-
fied, legacy applications, whereas the prior art requires appli-
cations to be rewritten to take advantage of the information 35 
flow control system. In the prior art, applications are required 
30 es's secrecy. Thus, within the enterprise network perimeter 
protected by the security system 100, users can access sensi-
tive resources as normal, using various programs of their 
choice, with information flow tracking being transparent to 
them and their applications. 
This novel functionality can be implemented using the 
wildcard capability 340 in the capability table for a taint 210. 
At taint creation, the user that creates a taint 210 can choose 
to set a default wildcard policy for other enterprise users, 
which can grants other users the s+ capability without grant-
40 ing them the s- capability. This policy can ensure that users 
other than the creator of the taint 210 can read sensitive 
to manage labels and capabilities programmatically and in a 
decentralized fashion. This approach proves difficult or 
impossible in most organizations where applications are pro-
prietary and run on commodity operating systems, and modi-
fying source code for such applications is not possible. 
Embodiments of the present invention need not require appli-
cation modification, and can work on commodity operating 
systems. Using a simple and lightweight operating system 
update that installs the labeler 125, label store 123, and host 45 
enforcer 115, the security system 100 can track information 
flow for unmodified applications by offloading the work of 
setting and managing policies on labels 200 to the users of the 
enterprise network 10 through the centralized authentication 
service and taint management console 445 and the capability 50 
database 430. 
resources labeled with the taint 210 but may not remove the 
taint 210, so as to leak information outside the network 10. 
In contrast, lowering secrecy or integrity, such as by unset-
ting a characteristic from a taint 210, can potentially cause 
data leaks, and may thus require explicit user action. Remov-
ing the secrecy characteristic 220 on a taint 210 for a resource 
is known as declassification. In some embodiments of the 
security system 100, declassification may always require user 
intervention, to confirm that the user wished to declassify a 
particular resource. In many cases, even if the user who 
requests declassification possesses the s- capability for the 
taint 210 in question, the authentication service and taint 
management console 445 can require the user to solve a 
55 CAPTCHA to ensure that the declassification is not requested 
by an automated malicious program masquerading as the 
A second advantage of various embodiments of the present 
invention is the ability to perform information flow tracking 
over hosts 50 in a large, globally distributed enterprise net-
work 10, whereas previous inventions in information flow 
control are limited to a single host or, at the most, to a small 
number of hosts. In the present invention, the host labelers 
125 can coordinate with the label repository 128 to transfer 
labels 200 between processes communicating over the net-
work 10. A globally distributed enterprise network 10 may 60 
have multiple globally distributed label repositories 128 to 
ensure information flow tracking at a global scale. The label 
communication scheme works on the existing IP protocol and 
thus requires no reconfiguration of traffic filtering rules in the 
enterprise network 10. 
A third and major improvement of some embodiments of 
the present invention is an improvement to the rules of infor-
user. 
Implementation: Overview 
One or more aspects of the security system 100 and related 
methods can be embodied, in whole or in part, in a computing 
device 700. For example, one or more hosts 50 can be com-
puting devices, and the network enforcer 118 can be a com-
puting device 700 or a portion thereof. FIG. 7 illustrates an 
example of a suitable computing device 700 that can be used 
65 in the network 10 in which the security system 100 operates, 
according to an exemplary embodiment of the present inven-
ti on. 
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Although specific components of a computing device 700 
are illustrated in FIG. 7, the depiction of these components in 
lieu ofothers does not limit the scope of the invention. Rather, 
various types of computing devices 700 can be used to imple-
ment embodiments of the security system 100. Exemplary 
embodiments of the security system 100 can be operational 
with numerous other general purpose or special purpose com-
puting system environments or configurations. Examples of 
well-known computing systems, environments, and/or con-
figurations that can be suitable for use with the invention 
include, but are not limited to, personal computers, server 
computers, hand-held or laptop devices, multiprocessor sys-
tems, microprocessor-based systems, set top boxes, program-
mable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputers, 
mainframe computers, distributed computing environments 
that include any of the above systems or devices, and the like. 
Exemplary embodiments of the security system 100 can be 
described in a general context of computer-executable 
instructions, such as one or more applications or program 
modules, stored on a computer-readable medium and 
executed by a computer processing unit. Generally, program 
modules can include routines, programs, objects, compo-
nents, or data structures that perform particular tasks or 
implement particular abstract data types. 
With reference to FIG. 7, components of the computing 
device 700 can comprise, without limitation, a processing 
unit 720 and a system memory 730. A system bus 721 can 
couple various system components including the system 
memory 730 to the processing unit 720. 
The computing device 700 can include a variety of com-
puter readable media. Computer-readable media can be any 
available media that can be accessed by the computing device 
700, including both volatile and nonvolatile, removable and 
non-removable media. For example, and not limitation, com-
puter-readable media can comprise computer storage media 
and communication media. Computer storage media can 
include, but are not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash 
memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital ver-
satile disks (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic 
cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other mag-
netic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used 
to store data accessible by the computing device 700. For 
example, and not limitation, communication media can 
include wired media such as a wired network or direct-wired 
connection, and wireless media such as acoustic, RF, infrared 
and other wireless media. Combinations of any of the above 
can also be included within the scope of computer readable 
media. 
The system memory 730 can comprise computer storage 
media in the form of volatile or nonvolatile memory such as 
read only memory (ROM) 731 and random access memory 
(RAM) 732. A basic input/output system 733 (BIOS), con-
taining the basic routines that help to transfer information 
between elements within the computing device 700, such as 
during start-up, can typically be stored in the ROM 731. The 
RAM 732 typically contains data and/or program modules 
that are immediately accessible to and/or presently in opera-
tion by the processing unit 720. For example, and not limita-
tion, FIG. 7 illustrates operating system 734, application pro-
grams 735, other program modules 736, and program data 
737. 
The computing device 700 can also include other remov-
able or non-removable, volatile or nonvolatile computer stor-
age media. By way of example only, FIG. 7 illustrates a hard 
disk drive 741 that can read from or write to non-removable, 
nonvolatile magnetic media, a magnetic disk drive 751 for 
reading or writing to a nonvolatile magnetic disk 752, and an 
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optical disk drive 755 for reading or writing to a nonvolatile 
optical disk 756, such as a CD ROM or other optical media. 
Other computer storage media that can be used in the exem-
plary operating environment can include magnetic tape cas-
settes, flash memory cards, digital versatile disks, digital 
video tape, solid state RAM, solid state ROM, and the like. 
The hard disk drive 741 can be connected to the system bus 
721 through a non-removable memory interface such as inter-
face 740, and magnetic disk drive 751 and optical disk drive 
10 7 55 are typically connected to the system bus 721 by a remov-
able memory interface, such as interface 750. 
The drives and their associated computer storage media 
discussed above and illustrated in FIG. 7 can provide storage 
15 of computer readable instructions, data structures, program 
modules and other data for the computing device 700. For 
example, hard disk drive 741 is illustrated as storing an oper-
ating system 744, application programs 745, other program 
modules 746, and program data 747. These components can 
20 either be the same as or different from operating system 734, 
application programs 735, other program modules 736, and 
program data 737. 
A web browser application program 735, or web client, can 
be stored on the hard disk drive 741 or other storage media. 
25 The web client 735 can request and render web pages, such as 
those written in Hypertext Markup Language ("HTML"), in 
another markup language, or in a scripting language. 
A user of the computing device 700 can enter commands 
and information into the computing device 700 through input 
30 devices such as a keyboard 762 and pointing device 761, 
commonly referred to as a mouse, trackball, or touch pad. 
Other input devices (not shown) can include a microphone, 
joystick, game pad, satellite dish, scanner, electronic white 
35 board, or the like. These and other input devices are often 
connected to the processing unit 720 through a user input 
interface 760 coupled to the system bus 721, but can be 
connected by other interface and bus structures, such as a 
parallel port, game port, or a universal serial bus (USB). A 
40 monitor 791 or other type of display device can also be 
connected to the system bus 721 via an interface, such as a 
video interface 790. In addition to the monitor, the computing 
device 700 can also include other peripheral output devices 
such as speakers 797 and a printer 796. These can be con-
45 nected through an output peripheral interface 795. 
The computing device 700 can operate in a networked 
environment, being in communication with one or more 
remote computers 780, such as other hosts 50, over the net-
work 10. The remote computer 780 can be a personal com-
50 puter, a server, a router, a network PC, a peer device, or other 
common network node, and can include many or all of the 
elements described above relative to the computing device 
700, including a memory storage device 781. 
When used in a LAN networking environment, the com-
55 puting device 700 can be connected to the LAN 771 through 
a network interface or adapter 770. When used in a WAN 
networking environment, the computing device 700 can 
include a modem 772 or other means for establishing com-
munications over the WAN 773, such as the internet. The 
60 modem 772, which can be internal or external, can be con-
nected to the system bus 721 via the user input interface 760 
or other appropriate mechanism. In a networked environ-
ment, program modules depicted relative to the computing 
device 700 can be stored in the remote memory storage 
65 device. For example, and not limitation, FIG. 7 illustrates 
remote application programs 785 as residing on memory 
storage device 781. It will be appreciated that the network 
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connections shown are exemplary and other means of estab-
lishing a communications link between the computers can be 
used. 
The inventors built a prototype of the security system 100, 
the details of which are discussed below. It will be understood 
that the prototype is illustrative of one exemplary embodi-
ment and does not limit the scope of the invention. 
Implementation: Host Components 
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the source originated from a page that had a label 200, the 
label 200 is carried over to the write-protected page, and the 
write protection is removed before allowing the instruction to 
execute. Otherwise, the write-protect is temporarily removed, 
the instruction is executed, and the write-protect is re-enabled 
before returning control back to user-space. 
In the prototype security system 100, the labeler 125, the 
label store 123, and the host enforcer 115 are implemented as 
an operating system patch for the open source Linux operat-
ing system. The labeler 125 is implemented using Linux 
Security Modules (LSM), which is a framework within the 
Linux kernel that allows various security models to be added-
An enterprise administrator installs the labeler 125 module 
on the operating system of the host 50 when the host is in a 
known "clean" state (e.g., as might be determined by an audit, 
10 
virus scanner, or by using a Linux distribution with the pre-
loaded labeler for installation). On reboots, the labeler 125 is 
automatically loaded shortly after initialization (i.e., init) dur-
ing the boot sequence. 
on without changing core kernel code. LSM provides hooks 15 
within system call handlers that can be implemented by a 
security module. Thus, a third party module can implement 
mandatory access control for a system call (e.g., read(2)) 
without changing the core implementation of the system call 
handler (e.g., sys_read). Using LSM hooks, the labeler 125 20 
intercepts all system calls that transfer information between 
resources on a host 50. Hooks are used to track information 
flow for system calls listed in Table 1, which appears below. 
These are merely exemplary, not limiting, and the security 
system 100 may track information flow for calls not listed in 25 
Table 1 or calls that are added to operating systems in future. 
TABLE 1 
The labeler 125 maintains a label 200 for every resource on 
the host 50 that is associated with at least one taint 210. Each 
taint 210 of a label 200 includes an identification, a secrecy 
bit, and an integrity bit. A taint 210 is described by the taint 
identification and its current setting of secrecy and integrity 
bits. The local labeler 125 does not maintain capabilities of 
the user that owns the resource, as such capabilities are main-
tained in the central capability database 130. For efficiency, 
the labeler 125 does not create or maintain labels 200 for files 
and directories that have no taints in their label 200, instead 
assigning such resources a "null" label 200. 
The local label store 123 is a partition that is encrypted 
using a key embedded in the kernel image. The local label 
store 123 is stored in a partition not readable to user space 
processes (enforced using LSM checks). On disk, labels 200 
Syscall Type 
Inter-process Communication 
File/device operations 
Process creation 
Memory operations 
Kernel configuration 
Example syscalls 
send(2), shrnat(2), msgsnd(2), 
kill(2) 
read(2), unlink(2), mknod(2) 
fork(2), execve(2), clone(2) 
mmap(2), mprotect(2) 
sysctl(2), init_module 
30 are indexed by the inode numbers or process identifications of 
the resources to which they map. Label 200 reads and writes 
are buffered using an in-memory cache. At shutdown, labels 
for files and directories are written to disk, and process labels 
are discarded. To prevent loss of sensitive labels 200 in the 
35 event of a machine crash, the prototype security system 100 
use a journaling file system on the label store 123 partition. 
Labels 200 of a file are written back to the label store 123 
before the file's inodes themselves are written to disk. In addition to hooking system calls that transfer informa-
tion, the prototype labeler 125 also monitors access to 
memory pages. Specifically, where the labels 200 are tracked 40 
at the granularity of memory pages, and not at the granularity 
of a process that consists of several memory pages, system 
calls are not sufficient to track all flow ofinformation between 
memory pages. For example, and not limitation, a userspace 
process may have two memory pages mapped into its virtual 45 
address space. Suppose that one of such memory pages has a 
label 210 attached to it while the other memory page does not. 
If the process executes an instruction in userspace that moves 
Although not required in every embodiment of the security 
system 100, the label store 123 of the prototype security 
system 100 back up the labels 200 to the label repository 128 
periodically. 
The labeler 125 enforces information flow control checks 
using the host enforcer 115, which is implemented as a kernel 
patch. Alternatively, the host enforcer 115 can be imple-
mented below the kernel in a hypervisor or on a trusted 
platform module. The host enforcer 115 executes with the 
same or higher security and privileges as the labeler 125. The 
labeler 125 invokes the host enforcer 115 when it detects a byte of data from the labeled memory page to the unlabeled 
memory page, a system call hook at the kernel will be unable 
to intercept this information flow. 
50 information flow between two resources that have incompat-
ible labels 200. The host enforcer 115 communicates with the 
To intercept this information flow from the kernel without 
placing any trust in the userspace applications, the labeler 125 
is augmented with additional functionality. Specifically, the 
labeler 125 uses hardware-level write protection on memory 55 
pages, which is available on all major processor architectures, 
to be notified whenever there is a write to a memory page. In 
the example of two memory pages cited above, the labeler 
125, at the time of allocating a memory page and mapping it 
to a process's virtual address space, sets the write-protection 60 
on the page if any other pages in the process's address space 
carry a label 200. This step can ensure that whenever an 
instruction executing in userspace attempts to copy informa-
tion to the unlabeled memory page, the write protection can 
raise a fault, which can be trapped by the labeler 125 residing 65 
in the kernel. At this point, the labeler 125 inspects the source 
and destination of the instruction that caused the trap. In case 
capability database 430 to retrieve the appropriate capabili-
ties, but in some instances, the host enforcer 115 can make a 
decision without querying the capability database 430. For 
example, ifthe sending resource's label 200 cannot be auto-
matically declassified and has one or more secrecy taints 210, 
and the destination is a removable drive, the host enforcer 115 
denies the information flow without checking the capability 
database 430. 
The capability database 130 and label repository 128 are 
hash tables that allow clients to look up values of keys. Both 
of these services are implemented using Redis, an exemplary 
high performance key-value store. Redis supports only string 
keys, but values can be of any type. Keys for the capability 
database are the taint identifications 250, and each value is a 
structure that contains the name for the taint 210 and a list of 
users and their capabilities over the taint 210. 
US 8,893,300 B2 
19 
Implementation: Network Components 
A challenge in enforcing information flow control through-
out the network 10 is that a receiving host's enforcer 115 may 
need to make information flow control decisions without 
having immediate access to the labels 200 associated with the 
sending resource. To uniquely associate a sending resource 
with a label 200, the sender's labeler 125 can annotate each 
packet with a resource identification and a version number. 
The network enforcer 118 or the enforcer 115 on the receiving 
host 50 can retrieve the sending resource's label 200 using the 10 
sender's IP address, resource identification, and version num-
ber from the label repository 128. The resource identification 
can be unique during a resource's lifetime. Version numbers 
can increment from zero and indicate the version of the send-
ing process's label 200. If the sending process's label 200 15 
changes, the sender's labeler 125 can annotate subsequent 
packets with the incremented version number to indicate to 
the receiving labeler 125 that the sender's label 200 has 
changed. 
During an information flow check, the receiving labeler 20 
125 can extract the resource identification and version num-
ber from the packet header for an incoming flow and can 
retrieve the sender's label 200 from the label repository 128. 
Because the labeler 125 has local access to the current label 
200 for the receiving process, the labeler 125 can perform 25 
information flow control checks using the host enforcer 115 at 
the receiving host 50 in the same, or similar manner, that such 
checks would be performed for an intra-host information flow 
check. 
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information flow control checks. If the information flow is 
permitted, the controller inserts a flow table entry in the 
switch, and data packets that match this entry are forwarded 
without further checks. If the version numbers embedded in 
the data packets change mid-flow, the flow table entry will no 
longer match, at which point the controller performs a new 
information flow check on the new version of the sender's 
label. 
Implementation: Security Features 
Although the label repository 128 can contain labels from 
various hosts 50, a particular labeler 125 can be limited to 
pushing and manipulating labels 200 in the label repository 
128 only for resources that are associated with its host 50. In 
some embodiments, labelers 125 can be uniquely identifiable 
so that the security system 100 can associate each labeler 125 
with its host 50, even as hosts 50 enter and leave the network 
10 or change IP addresses. Thus, an administrator may assign 
a unique private/public key pair to each labeler 125 when the 
labeler 125 is installed on the corresponding host 50. The 
public key can act as an identification for the host 50 and can 
be used for self-certification. The public key can also be used 
to generate a session encryption key to encrypt control traffic 
related to the security system 100. 
When a host 50 enters the network 10 and joins the security 
system 100, its labeler 125 can register with a labeler authen-
tication service. The labeler authentication service can asso-
ciate each host 50 with its host identification, so the public key 
for a host 50 can be used to prove the labeler's identity and to 
The network enforcer 118 can typically reside at bound-
aries between networks of different trust levels, such as at the 
edge of the enterprise network 10 leading to the Internet, or 
between wired and wireless network boundaries within the 
enterprise. The network enforcer 118 can have policies that 
designate immutable secrecy and integrity taint sets to certain 
destination prefixes or to specific ports of the network device. 
For example, and not limitation, a host enforcer 115 of a 
sending host 50 can designate traffic destined to the Internet 
30 securely establish an expirable session key for use between 
the labeler 125 and enterprise services (e.g., label repository 
128, capability database 430, authentication service and taint 
management console 445). The labeler 125 can interact 
securely with the label repository 128 to register storage for 
35 itself as needed and to push and retrieve labels 200 for inter-
host communication. 
In some cases, a host 50 may have multiple network inter-
faces, with only one is connected to the enterprise network 
(i.e., the "primary" interface). In that case, the labeler 125 can as having a particular immutable taint 210. When a network 
enforcer 118 sees a new data flow, it can extract the resource 
identification and version number from the packet header and 
retrieve the sender's label 200 from the label repository 128. 
The network enforcer 118 can then perform information flow 
control checks to ensure that the attempted information flow 
is permitted. When the network enforcer 118 sees the immu-
table taint 210 related to Internet traffic, it can determine 
whether the sending process had any secrecy taints 210 at all. 
40 determine the primary interface, so as to denote all other 
interfaces as potential avenues for data leaks. To discover the 
primary interface, the host labeler 125 can broadcast a mes-
sage to all configured interfaces and then designate the inter-
face on which it receives a signed response from the labeler 
45 authentication service as the primary network interface. 
If the sending process had secrecy taints, the network 
enforcer 118 can prohibit the attempted information flow. 
The security system 100 can fix the taints of certain 
resources, so as to limit the abilities of such resources. For 
example, at boot time, the host enforcer 115 can build a list of 
all output devices (except the display device) as potential 
If a flow passes information flow control checks, the net-
work enforcer 118 can install a rule that allows future packets 
with the same resource identification and version number 
back into the network 10 without undergoing checks. 
50 avenues for information leaks. The host enforcer can then set 
Although the network enforcer 118 may be any of various 
devices capable ofinspecting network traffic and correspond- 55 
ing labels from the label repository 128, the prototype secu-
rity system 100 uses a slightly-modified OpenFlow switch 
implementation, along with a custom NOX controller that 
communicates with the switch over a secure channel. The 
controller queries the capability database 130 and the label 60 
repository 128 to make information flow decisions and 
installs rules on the network switch to forward or block flows 
based on the decisions. The prototype security system 100 
uses modified OpenFlow switches to augment flow table 
entries with label version numbers. When a new flow arrives, 65 
the switch forwards the traffic to the controller, and the net-
work enforcer 118 at the controller performs any necessary 
an immutable label 200 of these devices, so as to prevent 
tainted resources from writing to these devices. The primary 
network interface card and the primary hard disk can be 
excluded from the devices receiving this label 200. These two 
devices can instead receive an immutable "master" label 200. 
The master label 200 can indicate that send(2) and recv(2) 
through these interfaces do not involve information flow 
checks or label adjustments. 
For example, and not limitation, all electronic messages 
and external drives, such as flash drives, can receive empty 
immutable labels 200. Thus, in the attempt of a user to copy a 
file to a flash drive where the file has any secrecy taints 210, 
the user may be unable to raise the secrecy of the flash drive 
so as to enable the information flow. However, if the user has 
the capability to lower the secrecy of the file with respect to 
the applicable taints 210, then the user can do so, thus 
enabling the file to written to the flash drive. 
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As mentioned above, a user who owns a taint 210 may limit 
which people have the capability of unsetting the secrecy 
characteristic 220 of that taint 210. Resultantly, a user may 
limit which users can transmit data associated with the taint 
210 outside of the network 10. 
In short, labels 200 can enable users of the security system 
100 to protect the flow of their data. By labeling a resource 
with a particular taint 210, a first user can assert control over 
the flow of information from that resource. The first user can 
grant a first set of other users the right to initiate information 10 
flows from the resource, and can grant a second set of other 
users the right to take information from the resource out of the 
network. 
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prises a first taint with characteristics in the first state and the 
second label lacks the first taint with characteristics in the first 
state. 
3. The security system of claim 2, the labeling system 
applying an immutable label to the second resource, wherein 
the second resource leads outside the computer network. 
4. The security system of claim 2, the enforcement system 
being configured to block the information flow to the second 
resource absent content-scanning of the information flow. 
5. The security system of claim 2, the enforcement system 
being configured to determine provenance of the first 
resource based on the first label having the first taint with 
characteristics in the first state. 
As discussed above in detail, various exemplary embodi-
ments of the present invention can provide an effective means 
6. The security system of claim 1, wherein according to a 
15 second capability set of a second user for the first taint, the 
second user lacks the capability to change the characteristics 
of the first taint from the second state to the first state. 
to reduce or prevent data leaks in an enterprise network, by 
requiring information flows to comply with applied resource 
labels. While security systems and methods have been dis-
closed in exemplary forms, many modifications, additions, 
and deletions may be made without departing from the spirit 20 
and scope of the system, method, and their equivalents, as set 
forth in the following claims. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A security system for a plurality of resources in a com- 25 
puter network having a plurality of hosts, the security system 
comprising: 
a computer processor; 
7. The security system of claim 1, the plurality ofresources 
comprising a plurality of database entries, wherein the label-
ing system is configured to apply a corresponding label to 
each of the plurality of database entries. 
8. The security system of claim 7, wherein the computer 
network is an enterprise network, the enforcement system 
being further configured to identify login credentials of users 
who access a database from locations external to the enter-
prise network, and to selectively allow authorized users to 
retrieve the database entries from locations external to the 
enterprise. 
a memory operatively coupled to the computer processor 
and configured for storing data and instructions; 
9. A security system for a plurality of resources in a com-
30 puter network having a plurality of hosts, the security system 
a plurality of taints, each taint configured to be applied by 
a labeling system to at least one of the plurality of 
resources, and each taint having a plurality of character-
istics including identification data, secrecy data, and 
integrity data, the characteristics variably being in a first 35 
state or a second state; 
a plurality of labels, each label comprising at least one 
taint; 
the labeling system in communication with the plurality of 
hosts and configured to apply, by the processor, a label of 40 
the plurality oflabels to a corresponding operating sys-
tem resource of the plurality of resources, and to receive 
notifications of attempted writes to the operating system 
resource, wherein the operating system resource 
includes one or more of a file, process, socket, thread, or 45 
memory page; 
a capability database configured for associating each of a 
plurality of users with a respective corresponding capa-
bility set for each respective taint of the plurality of 
taints, wherein according to a first capability set of a first 50 
user for a first taint, the first user has a capability to 
change the characteristics of the first taint from the sec-
ond state to the first state, and from the first state to the 
second state, in the first label, 
wherein the labeling system is further configured to auto- 55 
matically modify the state of the first label on behalf of 
the first user, to facilitate the information flow; and 
an enforcement system in communication with the plural-
ity of hosts and configured to block outgoing computer 
network traffic from each host, responsive to determin- 60 
ing the outgoing computer network traffic includes a first 
resource where at least one taint in a first label of the first 
resource is in the first state. 
2. The security system of claim 1, the enforcement system 
being configured to block an information flow from the first 65 
resource having the first label to a second resource having a 
second label, responsive to determining the first label com-
comprising: 
a computer processor; 
a memory operatively coupled to the computer processor 
and configured for storing data and instructions; 
a plurality of taints, each taint configured to be applied by 
a labeling system to at least one of the plurality of 
resources, and each taint having a plurality of character-
istics including identification data, secrecy data, and 
integrity data, the characteristics variably being in a first 
state or a second state; 
a plurality of labels, each label comprising at least one 
taint; 
the labeling system in communication with the plurality of 
hosts and configured to apply, by the processor, a label of 
the plurality oflabels to a corresponding operating sys-
tem resource of the plurality of resources, and to receive 
notifications of attempted writes to the operating system 
resource, wherein the operating system resource 
includes one or more of a file, process, socket, thread, or 
memory page; 
a capability database configured for associating each of a 
plurality of users with a respective corresponding capa-
bility set for each respective taint of the plurality of 
taints, wherein according to a first capability set of a first 
user for a first taint, the first user has a capability to 
change the characteristics of the first taint from the sec-
ond state to the first state, but not from the first state to 
second state, in the first label, 
wherein the labeling system is further configured to auto-
matically modify the state of the first label on behalf of 
the first user, to facilitate the information flow; and 
an enforcement system in communication with the plural-
ity of hosts and configured to block outgoing computer 
network traffic from each host, responsive to determin-
ing the outgoing computer network traffic includes a first 
resource where at least one taint in a first label of the first 
resource is in the first state. 
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10. The security system of claim 9, the enforcement system 
being configured to block an information flow from the first 
resource having the first label to a second resource having a 
second label, responsive to determining the first label com-
prises a first taint with characteristics in the first state and the 
second label lacks the first taint with characteristics in the first 
state. 
11. The security system of claim 9, the labeling system 
applying an immutable label to the second resource, wherein 
the second resource leads outside the computer network. 10 
12. The security system of claim 9, the enforcement system 
being configured to block the information flow to the second 
resource absent content-scanning of the information flow. 
13. The security system of claim 9, the enforcement system 
being configured to determine provenance of the first 15 
resource based on the first label having the first taint with 
characteristics in the first state. 
14. The security system of claim 9, wherein according to a 
second capability set of a second user for the first taint, the 
second user lacks the capability to change the first taint from 20 
the second state to the first state. 
15. The security system of claim 9, the plurality of 
resources comprising a plurality of database entries, wherein 
the labeling system is configured to apply a corresponding 
label to each of the plurality of database entries. 25 
16. The security system of claim 15, wherein the computer 
network is an enterprise network, the enforcement system 
being further configured to identify login credentials of users 
who access a database from locations external to the enter-
prise network, and to selectively allow authorized users to 30 
retrieve the database entries from locations external to the 
enterprise. 
* * * * * 
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